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Abstract
In light of the intertwining logics of military competition and economic
interdependence at play in Sino–American relations, this paper examines
how the United States has balanced conﬂicting national security and
economic interests in the making of US export control policy on defense-
related technology toward China. Relying upon a large body of primary
sources (including 170 interviews), it seeks to contribute to the under-
standing of this strategically sensitive yet neglected area of Sino–American
relations. It is shown that, as a consequence of the erosion of the US cap-
acity to control the diffusion of defense-related technology to China in the
post-Cold War era, a growing set of actors within the United States has
reassessed the security/economic calculus in Washington’s relationship
with Beijing. Speciﬁcally, this coalition advocates the streamlining of export
controls to sustain the defense and technological industrial base and
thereby maintain American military/technological preeminence vis-à-vis a
rising China.
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1 Introduction
Since the establishment of their diplomatic relations in 1979, the econ-
omies of the United States and that of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) have grown increasingly interdependent. US–China bilateral trade
has dramatically increased from $5 billion in 1981 to $536 billion in 2012,
and the PRC is today the second-largest US trading partner (Morrison,
2013). Coupled with the growth in their economic relations, however, in
the post-Cold War era, there have been growing concerns within the US
government over China’s military modernization. Fueled by its rapid eco-
nomic expansion, the constant rise in China’s defense budgets, its import
of foreign technologies, and its military-industrial espionage practices have
fostered a major military modernization program. Successive US adminis-
trations have carefully scrutinized and responded to the evolving strategy
and military capabilities of their ‘most likely future politico-military near
peer competitor’ (USCNS, 1999: 70). The US–China relationship has
therefore been characterized by a mixture of mutual economic interests
and competition in the military realm. Arguably, this mixture of multiple
and contradictory interests is one of the fundamental features of the
post-Cold War international environment. During the Cold War, the
United States and the Soviet Union were economically independent. As a
consequence, economic statecraft was integrated with and subordinated to
US security objectives. In the post-Cold War era, the absence of an over-
arching strategic threat, coupled with growing economic interdependen-
cies, has created an international system in which the two objectives of
economic welfare and the protection of national security increasingly
represent trade-offs. As Richard Rosecrance argues, ‘the essential problem
for countries seeking to enhance both security and the economy is that
success in one may involve a trade-off that entails failure in the other’
(1997: 211).
In light of the intertwining logics of military rivalry and economic inter-
dependence at play in Sino-American relations, this paper examines how
Washington has balanced potentially conﬂicting national security and eco-
nomic interests in its relationship with Beijing. To do so, it investigates
the making of US export control policy on defense-related technology to
China in the post-Cold War era. Export controls stand at the frontier
between military considerations (the maintenance of military preeminence
by avoiding the transfer of sensitive technologies to potential competitors)
434 HugoMeijer
and economic interests ( job creation, exports, and economic growth). At
any time, a balance must be found between the economic interests involved
in exporting high technologies and the military implications of potential
transfers of sensitive technologies. Trade-offs are therefore intrinsic to
export control policy. This is especially true for dual-use technologies such
as high-performance computers (HPCs) – the technology examined in this
paper – given that their high technological content makes them at once
highly proﬁtable exports and sensitive technologies with military applica-
tions.1 High-performance computers, or supercomputers, have both civil-
ian applications (such as weather forecasting) and military/intelligence
applications. They are used by the National Security Agency (NSA) for
code breaking (cryptography) and code protection (cryptoanalysis), and
by the Pentagon for simulating nuclear weapon tests, chemical and bio-
logical weapon production, designing and modeling complete submarine
hulls, developing non-acoustic anti-submarine warfare sensors, and
designing improved nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. At the same
time, China has become by far the largest single export market for US
‘controlled’ technologies – i.e. subject to export controls – with 86% of the
total, with Russia ranking as second with roughly 6% (DOC, 2011: 61).
Accordingly, while growing US economic interests in the Chinese market
are likely to press for liberalizing the controls on the export of these tech-
nologies, their relevance for the modernization of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) would require the maintenance of stringent controls. US
export control policy therefore exempliﬁes the delicate balance between
national security and economic interests that Washington must strike in its
relationship with Beijing. As Adam Segal puts it, ‘the problem of design-
ing effective export control policies for China exempliﬁes paradigmatic
changes in the relationship among technology, trade, and national security
since the fall of the Soviet Union’ (Segal, 2004: 169).
Furthermore, American post-Cold War export control policy toward
China is currently largely under-explored. Several works exist on US Cold
War export control policy toward the PRC (Ross, 1995; Zhang, 2001;
Meijer, 2015). However, despite the rise of China as a major world power,
the national and multilateral efforts to control the transfer of defense-
related technologies to the PRC in the post-Cold War era have been largely
1 ‘Dual-use’ refers to goods and technologies that have both commercial and military
applications.
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neglected. Some articles have analyzed speciﬁc and limited areas of US
restrictions on trade with China in the 1990s, such as the controversies
over the controls on communication satellites, as they became a highly sen-
sitive political issue during the so-called Chinagate (Clarke and Johnston,
1999; Johnson-Freese, 2000; Yuan, 1996). Similarly, within the literature
on US–China relations, although the issue of technology controls has been
touched upon by some studies (Harding, 1992; Suettinger, 2003), no
in-depth analysis of this facet of the US–China relationship in the
post-Cold War period has ever been the subject of scholarly enquiry. By
relying on a large body of primary sources (170 interviews, Congressional
hearings, and declassiﬁed documents from the National Security Archive),
this study aims to partially ﬁll this gap in the literature by investigating this
strategically sensitive yet neglected area of the Sino–American relationship.
Speciﬁcally, through the prism of a sociology of decision-making, the
paper seeks to identify the key actors and coalitions of actors that have
competed in the making of US export control policy toward China and
to capture their policy positions on the nexus between the national security
and economic interests at stake in US–China relations. To do so, it partly
builds upon the sociology of elite literature and the ‘programmatic approach’,
developed in the framework of the research program Operationalizing
Programmatic Elites Research in America, which integrates several comple-
mentary methods (Genieys, 2010; Genieys and Hassenteufel, 2012, 2015).2
First, following Charles Wright Mills (1956), the positional method assesses
the conﬁgurations of power within an elite by examining who occupies the
key positions in the executive and legislative branches. The positions taken
into account are, in the executive branch, those having responsibilities for the
so called China Desk, East Asian and Paciﬁc affairs, nonproliferation, export
controls and international trade in the National Security Council (NSC), the
Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. In the legislative branch, the
positions include those of the Congressmen and their congressional staffers
in the Armed Services, Foreign Relations/Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and
Banking Committees – both in the Senate and the House of Representatives
(HRs). Second, the reputational method aims at identifying through multiple
interviews of those actors that have the reputation of being highly inﬂuential.
Third, based upon Robert Dahl’s decisional method (Dahl, 1961), the time
2 The present work was conducted within the framework of the OPERA research group,
funded by the French National Research Agency (ANR-08-BLAN-0032).
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period considered is ﬁrst divided in a number of sub-periods according to the
turning points, or key decisions, in the evolution of a policy. A meticulous
empirical analysis, based upon large body of primary sources, is then made
to assess why and how the policy changes happened (Genieys and
Hassenteufel, 2012). A ‘key actor’ is here deﬁned as an individual that cumu-
lates several resources: the position, reputation, and actual inﬂuence over
policy outcomes in a given policy domain and at a given point in time.
A ‘coalition’ is a set of actors coming from avariety of institutions (executive
branch, legislative body, and pressure groups) who share a common policy
position and seek to inﬂuence policy outcomes in a given policy domain.
The paper seeks to demonstrate that, as a consequence of the erosion of
the US capacity to control the diffusion of defense-related technology to
China in the post-Cold War era, a growing set of actors in the United
States (the Run Faster coalition) has reassessed the security/economic cal-
culus in Washington’s relationship with Beijing. While the Control Hawks
coalition advocates the implementation of highly stringent export controls
because of fears that transfer of sensitive technologies to China would
damage US security interests–framing its policy position in the Cold War
paradigm of a trade-off between national security and economic interests–,
the Run Faster coalition moves beyond this trade-off pressing for the liber-
alization of controls in order to protect US national security. Speciﬁcally,
this set of actors advocates the streamlining of export controls to sustain
the defense and technological industrial base and thereby maintain
American military/technological preeminence vis-à-vis a rising China. It
will be shown that changing dynamics at the multilateral, technological,
and bilateral levels have given momentum to the Run Faster coalition
allowing it to prevail over its rival coalition. In order to substantiate this
argument, the paper ﬁrst provides a cartography of the key actors involved
in the making of US export control policy during the Clinton administra-
tion, describes the key tenets of each coalition, and demonstrates that the
Run Faster coalition drove Washington’s supercomputer export control
policy toward China in the 1990s (Section 1). It then investigates the com-
petition in the policy-making process during the George W. Bush adminis-
tration showing the continued preeminence of the Run Faster coalition in
shaping policy outcomes in the 2000s (Section 2). In conclusion, having
illustrated how the Obama administration’s export control reform is based
upon the key tenets of the Run Faster coalition, the paper assesses the con-
tribution of its ﬁndings to the understanding of Sino–American relations
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and its potential implications for the future of American military/techno-
logical primacy in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
2 The making of US export control policy toward
China during the Clinton administration
2.1 Key actors in the executive branch
During the Clinton administration, the key bureaucratic actors in the
making of export control policy were those composing the so-called trium-
virate – the Departments of Commerce, State and Defense – with the NSC
coordinating the interagency process and acting as a broker when disagree-
ments emerged among the agencies. These actors combined the position,
reputation, and inﬂuence upon speciﬁc policy outcomes that made them
the ‘key players’ in the decision-making process. Under the direction of
Secretary Ron Brown, the key Commerce Department ofﬁcials identiﬁed
in Table 1 took the lead in pushing for the liberalization of export controls.
At the same time, the Department of Defense (DOD) assumed a very dif-
ferent role than the one it had played throughout the 1980s, when it was
the main veto player against the loosening of export controls (Meijer,
2013a: Ch. 2). As explained in more detail later, the Pentagon came to
believe that excessively stringent export controls harm, rather than protect,
US national security and therefore began to support the liberalization of
controls. As a lobbyist for the computer industry puts it, Secretary of
Defense ‘William Perry was a strong proponent of reform because he
believed that overly restrictive export controls would undermine the indus-
trial base and technological pre-eminence and ultimately the military
superiority of the United States’ (lobbyist, interview, October 2010).
The other key ofﬁcials within the DOD identiﬁed in Table 1, including the
Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA, the
Pentagon agency in charge of export controls), shared Secretary Perry’s
views. The regional bureau, the Pentagon’s Directorate for the PRC,
Taiwan, and Mongolia, tended to rely on the technical expertise of DTSA,
and ultimately to defer authority to it, both on individual licensing cases
and in the overall export control process.3
3 Randall Schriver, Country Director for PRC–Taiwan, 1995–1997, and then Senior Country
Director for the PRC, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Pentagon, 1997–1998 (interview, April
2010).
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Table 1 Key executive branch actors in the 1990s
Name Position Year
National Security Council
Daniel Ponemana Special Assistant to the President and Director for
Non-proliferation and Export Controls
1993–1996
Gary Samorea Special Assistant to the President and Director for
Non-proliferation and Export Controls
1996–2001
William Clementsa Director for Non-proliferation and Export Controls 1993–1995
Maureen Tuckera Director for Non-proliferation and Export Controls 1996–2006
Department of Commerce
Ron Brown Secretary of Commerce 1993–1996
William Daley Secretary of Commerce 1997–2000
William Reinscha Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration 1994–2001
Sue Eckerta Assistant Secretary for Export Administration 1993–1997
Roger Majak Assistant Secretary for Export Administration 1997–2001
Ian Bairda Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration 1992–2000
Department of Defense
William Perry Secretary of Defense 1994–1997
William Cohen Secretary of Defense 1997–2001
John Deutcha Deputy Secretary of Defense 1994–1995
John Hamre Deputy Secretary of Defense 1997–2000
Ashton Carter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy
1993–1996
Kenneth Flamm Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Dual Use
Technology and International Program
1993–1995
Mitchel Wallersteina Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counterproliferation Policy and Senior Representative
for Trade Security Policy
1993–1997
David Tarbella Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology
Security Policy and Director of DTSA
1994–2001
Department of State
Warren Christopher Secretary of State 1993–1997
Madeleine Albright Secretary of State 1997–2001
Lynn Davis Under Secretary for International Security Affairs 1993–1997
John Holum Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security Affairs
1998–2000
Thomas McNamaraa Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs 1994–1998
Eric Newsom Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs 1998–2000
William Lowella Director of the Ofﬁce of Defense Trade Controls 1994–2003
aInterviewed by the author.
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The Commerce Department and senior ofﬁcials (mostly political
appointees) in the Pentagon tended to share relatively complementary
views on the need to engage in an overall reform of the export control
system while the State Department tended to resist such reform. Indeed,
the key actors in the State Department (Table 1), including those within
the Ofﬁce of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC), were the most reluctant
vis-à-vis export control reform throughout the Clinton administration.
The State Department’s Ofﬁce for Chinese and Mongolian Affairs (the
so-called China Desk) did favor a policy of engagement with China and a
more factoring in of broader foreign policy considerations (namely the
stability of the bilateral relationship) and economic interests in the making
of export control policy toward China. The ‘China Desk’ therefore advo-
cated for less stringent export controls toward the PRC. However, as the
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Paciﬁc Affairs Winston
Lord explains, it tended to defer decisions to the bureau within the State
Department that had the technical expertise required to address export
control policy (i.e. ODTC) and, as a consequence, did not weigh into very
heavily in the decision-making process (interview, April 2010).
Above the triumvirate, the key actors in NSC – within the Non-
proliferation and Export Controls Directorate (Table 1) – sided with the
Departments of Commerce and of Defense supporting the streamlining of
export controls. The NSC had a consistent approach throughout the two
Clinton administrations, in terms of being ‘very pro-liberalization’.4 Here
too, the regional division of the NSC, the Directorate for Asian Affairs,
while supporting the liberalization of controls to China and expressing its
views in interagency meetings, tended to defer to the Non-Proliferation and
Export Controls Directorate. The Clinton administration was able to over-
come interbureaucratic disagreements within the ‘triumvirate’ over the desir-
ability of export control liberalization because, as Under Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration William Reinsch explains, in the tri-
angular game between the Departments of Commerce, Defense and State,
‘if you get two of the three agencies to agree on what to do you can roll the
other one,’ and this was possible because ‘the National Security Council and
the President were on our side, [i.e. of the Departments of Commerce and
Defense], so for us these [interbureaucratic] ﬁghts were worthy because we
4 Interview with James Lewis, export controls ofﬁcial in the Departments of State and
Commerce throughout the 1990s (April 2010).
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knew that if we moved our way up the ladder we were likely to win’ (inter-
view, March, 2010).
2.1.1 Key tenets of the run faster coalition:
(i) The decreased capacity of the United States to control defense-related
technology diffusion.
The Run Faster coalition was composed of aforementioned actors in the
NSC, the Department of Commerce, and the Pentagon’s key political
appointees – supported by their backers in Congress and by the high-tech
industry. This coalition pressed for the streamlining of US export controls
to China (as well as to other destinations) on the basis of the following
considerations. First, in the post-Cold War era, the lack of a perceived
common strategic threat, as was the Soviet Union during the Cold War, led
to increasingly divergent interests within the multilateral institution
governing export controls (COCOM), to its consequent collapse in 1994,
and eventually to its replacement with a weaker multilateral framework
(the Wassenaar Arrangement).5 This, in turn, made many US restrictions
unilateral and therefore ineffective. Especially in the case of China, the
world’s fastest growing export market, unilateral export controls would
harm the US high-tech industry by putting it at a competitive disadvan-
tage relative to foreign competitors not subject to the same levels of
control, without inhibiting the PRC’s ability to acquire sensitive technolo-
gies from foreign sources. Second, the rapidly increasing innovation rates
and technological capabilities of the commercial sector meant that
advanced technologies were becoming increasingly available on the com-
mercial market. Coupled with China’s growing indigenous capabilities, the
worldwide diffusion of commercially developed technologies and the pro-
liferation of alternative sources of supply (the so-called foreign availability
of a technology) had made export controls increasingly ineffective, all the
more so in the framework of a weak multilateral architecture. As a conse-
quence of these trends, this coalition of actors came to believe that the
5 The post-Cold War multilateral institution governing export controls, the Wassenaar
Arrangement – which replaced the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM) in 1996 – lacks COCOM’s unanimity rule that provided the United
States, as well as each COCOMmember, with the right to veto the individual exports of other
member countries. The post-Cold War multilateral export control architecture is therefore a
much loser system and is less effective than its Cold War predecessor.
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ability of the United States to impose effective controls on dual-use
exports had signiﬁcantly eroded.6
(ii) The commercialization of the Pentagon’s industrial base.
Coupled with the erosion of the US ability to control the diffusion of
dual-use technologies, the civilianization (or commercialization) of the
Pentagon’s industrial base led this coalition to rethink the nature of and
the relationship between national security and economic interests in the
post-Cold War era. Throughout the Cold War and until the mid-1980s,
state-of-the-art technologies applicable to military systems were most often
generated by defense contractors funded by governments and then trans-
ferred and adapted to the commercial marketplace (examples include the
GPS and Internet). Since the 1980s, however, and increasingly so after the
end of the ColdWar, commercial research and development (R&D) expen-
ditures gradually came to outpace government R&D funding and the gap
between the two constantly widened in the post-Cold era (Brzoska, 2006).
As a consequence, the center of gravity in the development of dual-use
technologies, especially information and communications technologies,
shifted from State-led research to the commercial private sector (Walsh,
2009: 133). Since the 1990s, as stressed by a report of the Defense Science
Board, the Pentagon has therefore gone ‘from relying almost exclusively
on a captive US defense industry to depending more on the commercial
market, both domestic and international’ (DOD, 1999: 27). And the con-
tinuing trend toward the globalization of high-tech industries meant that
exports had become the key to the growth and good health of the US infor-
mation and communication technology sector. The Pentagon had there-
fore grown increasingly dependent on production and R&D by high-tech
companies whose primary sales were in the civilian market and in exports.
(iii) The shifting security/economic nexus.
The growing reliance of the Pentagon on civilian ﬁrms to supply
state-of-the-art dual-use technologies had a major impact on the making
of export control policy given that ‘any signiﬁcant restriction on exports
would likely slow corporate growth and limit the extent to which proﬁts
can be put back into research and development on next-generation
6 On the weakening of the US capacity to restrict the diffusion of dual-use technology, see
Meijer 2011.
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technology’ and thereby weaken the technological and industrial base on
which the Pentagon depended ever more (DOD, 1999: 27). As Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Mitchel Wallerstein stated in a
Congressional testimony, ‘this situation requires that we be careful not to
put US exporters at any unnecessary competitive disadvantage, particular-
ly when export revenues are important contribution to proﬁtability and to
ﬁnancing defense-related R&D’ (Senate, 1995: 6).
Accordingly, the Run Faster coalition came to believe that, given the
erosion of the capacity of the United States to control the diffusion of
defense-related technology and given the growing reliance of the Pentagon
on commercially developed advanced technologies, overly stringent export
controls, by reducing the export revenues that US high-tech ﬁrms could re-
invest into R&D on next-generation technologies, would weaken the
ability of the Pentagon to access state-of-the-art technologies. As former
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior
Director for Asia at the National Security Council Kenneth Lieberthal
explains, the regulation that was effective during the Cold War now
reduced the national security of the United States by inhibiting the indus-
try’s capacity to optimize R&D while at the same time not preventing the
PRC from obtaining these technologies (interview, April 2010). Rather
than exclusively trying to keep China ‘behind’ through stringent export
controls, the United States should also ‘run faster.’ Daniel Poneman,
Special Assistant to the President and Director for Non-proliferation and
Export Controls at the National Security Council, points out that this co-
alition of actors ‘realized that they needed to make a virtue of necessity
and that the national security of the US was tied up in learning in how to
run faster in developing new technology rather than only trying to stop
people from catching up with us’ (interview, August 2011). And this
required a healthy and vibrant commercial high-tech industrial base.
Accordingly, liberalizing export controls (together with efforts to enhance
commercial-military integration and to invest in high-tech R&D) was con-
sidered necessary to stay ahead in the new post-Cold War technological,
military, and economic environment.
The Run Faster coalition therefore moved beyond the traditional Cold
War trade-off ‘national security versus economics’ by reframing the debate
in terms of ‘protecting national security by pursuing economic interests.’
Indeed, as detailed elsewhere (Meijer, 2013a), during the Cold War, the
actors involved in the decision-making process assumed a trade-off
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between national security and economic interests. In the words of Winston
Lord, US Ambassador to the PRC and later Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Paciﬁc Affairs, during the Cold War:
in dealing with these sensitive exports there was always a tension
between those who were mostly concerned about the security implica-
tions of dual-technologies and those who worried about our exports or
trade balances. […] There was a tension between the importance of
helping jobs and exports for the Americans versus giving China some
technologies that could be used against our security interests’ (interview,
April 2010).
In contrast, as explained by Daniel Poneman, former Special Assistant to
the President on nonproliferation and export controls, in the post-Cold
War era a growing set of actors (the Run Faster coalition) came to believe
that ‘the traditional dichotomy of economic prosperity versus security is
in fact a false dichotomy’ (interview, August 2011). US national security
and speciﬁcally the ability of the military to maintain the technological/
military lead relative to potential competitors, such as China, would
therefore be achieved by promoting the economic interests of US high-
tech companies rather than by hindering them through stringent export
controls, as was the case during the Cold War. Two key Commerce
Department ofﬁcials, Ian Baird and William Reinsch, later characterized
this move beyond the paradigm of ‘the national security versus econom-
ics’ trade-off as follow: ‘the traditional logic has been reversed – limiting
exports hurts our national security (by impoverishing companies we
depend upon) and enhancing an appropriate level of exports enhances our
security (by ensuring our military has the means to ‘run faster’ than its ad-
versaries)’ (Baird and Reinsch, 2002: 79–80). This theme, synthesized by
Reinsch in ‘exports = healthy high-tech companies = strong defense,’ is a
key rationale of the Run Faster coalition behind the making of US export
control policy (Reinsch, 1999: 4).
2.2 Congress and the Control Hawks
On the other side of the spectrum, the Control Hawks attempted to
counter the momentum for export control liberalization brought about by
the Run Faster coalition. Throughout the 1990s, the Control Hawks coali-
tion comprised key Republican Congressmen and their staffers in both the
HRs and the Senate, career ofﬁcials within the Pentagon who opposed the
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policy position of the key political appointees in the Department, as well
as newspaper journalists, nonproliferation think tanks, and inﬂuential
former government ofﬁcials (see Table 2).
Table 2 Key actors in the ‘Control Hawks’ coalition in the 1990s
Name Position Year
US Senate
James Strom
Thurmond (R-SC)
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 1995–1999
JohnWarner (R-VA) Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 1999–2001
John McCain (R-AZ) Chairman of the Commerce Committee 1997–2001
Jessie Helms (R-NC) Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 1995–2001
Jon Kyl (R-AZ) Member of the Committee on Armed Services 1993–1994
Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence 1995–2002
Fred Thompson (R-TN) Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee 1997–2001
Richard Shelby (R-AL) Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence 1997–2001
US House of Representatives
Henry Hyde (R-Ill) Member of the International Relations Committee 1993–2007
Duncan Hunter (R-CA) Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military
Procurement of the Committee on Armed Services
1995–2000
Floyd Spence (R-SC) Member of the Armed Services Committee and
Chairman of the Committee on National Security
1995–1998
Think tanks
Gary Milhollin Founder and Executive Director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control
1986–present
Congressional staffers
William Triplett Chief Republican Counsel to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee
1997–2001
Edward Timperlake Professional Staff Member of the Committee on
Rules in the US House of Representatives
1996–1998
Former Pentagon ofﬁcials
Henry Sokolski* Deputy for Non-proliferation Policy in the Ofﬁce of
the Secretary of Defense
1989–1993
Stephen Bryen* Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, co-founder,
and ﬁrst Director of DTSA
1981–1988
Newspaper journalists
Bill Gertz Editor, Columnist, and Reporter for the
Washington Times
1985–present
Pentagon career ofﬁcials
No speciﬁc available information
*interviewed by the author
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Only a relatively limited number of Congressmen, and their congres-
sional staffers, would weigh into the debates over US export control policy
toward China. The Control Hawks coalition in Congress was relatively
small but was very vocal and effective. In the Senate, the strongest oppo-
nents to export control liberalization were in the Committees on Armed
Services, Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs, Commerce, and the
Select Committee on Intelligence. In the Senate Banking Committee,
which has jurisdiction in the Senate for export controls and was more re-
ceptive to export control reform, a number of Republican Senators were
supportive of the administration’s reform effort, such as Senators Phil
Gramm (R-TX), Chairman of the Committee (1995–2000), and Senator
Michael Enzi (R-WY), as well as Democratic Senators Tim Johnson
(D-SD) and Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and RankingMinority Member for the
Democrats. The support of the liberalization of controls by Republican
Senators Gramm and Enzi indicates how, while the Democrats tended to
favor the liberalization of export controls, the main division was in the
Republican party. As stressed by James Jochum, Congressional staffer in the
Senate Banking Committee (1994–2000), ‘the political split on export con-
trols generally lies within the Republican party, it is not a Democrats versus
Republicans split. [As a Congressional staffer], I always had to deal with an
intra-party issue’ (interview, March, 2010). In the HRs, the International
Relations Committee (which has jurisdiction over export controls) and the
Armed Services Committee were the most inﬂuential committees. In par-
ticular, Representatives Henry Hyde (R-Ill), Duncan Hunter (R-CA), and
Floyd Spence (R-SC) led the anti-liberalization drive in the HRs. The
Control Hawks opposition to the liberalization of export controls was
rooted in the concern that loosening controls to China would facilitate the
modernization of the PLA and thereby threaten US national security. In
their view, stopping technologies ﬂow to Chinawas not only possible but ne-
cessary to protect US national security. They considered that the Clinton
administration’s export control policies were giving primacy to economic
interests to the detriment of national security, assuming a trade-off between
the two. Representative Spence voiced ‘his concern that the Administration
has placed commercial interests above US national security interests’ (HR,
1996). Similarly, for Senator Thompson, ‘the current licensing process is
ﬂawed because it discounts our national security interests too much in favor
of promoting exports’ (US Senate, 1998: 2).
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An important source of information for Congressmen concerned by the
potential diversion of sensitive technology to the PRC was the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a nonproliferation think tank directed
by Gary Milhollin. He wrote several articles stressing how the Clinton ad-
ministration had sacriﬁced US national security for economic interests
(Milhollin, 2000, 2001). Milhollin also testiﬁed numerous times in
Congress voicing his concerns over the relaxation of export controls to
China (US HR, 1997; US Senate, 1998a). According to several intervie-
wees, information was often leaked by a number of career ofﬁcials and
engineers within DTSA – who were opposed to the policy positions of the
political appointees in the Pentagon – to Congressional staffers, the
Wisconsin Project, and the press (often to the Washington Times).7 Two
Congressional staffers, William Triplett and Edward Timperlake, wrote the
book Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America
that accused the Clinton-Gore administration of having ‘sacriﬁced national
security for money [and of having] materially assisted Beijing’s military
ambitions’ (1999: 12). According to the Los Angeles Times journalist James
Mann, Triplett ‘was a master of the well-timed leak [and] spoke regularly to
elite newspapers, but also knew how to work with the Washington Times,
the wire services, or even magazines’ (Mann, 1999: 243). Bill Gertz of the
Washington Times also wrote a book titled Betrayal: How the Clinton
Administration Undermined American Security that criticized the Clinton
administration’s policies (Gertz, 1999). The ties between the Pentagon’s
DTSA career ofﬁcials, Congressional staffers, Washington-based think
tanks, and newspaper columnists allowed the Control Hawks to give a broad
media echo to their concerns. Finally, a number of high-proﬁle former
Pentagon ofﬁcials opposed to the liberalization of controls to China were
also often called to testify in hearings before Congress, such as Henry
Sokolski (Deputy for Non-proliferation Policy in the Ofﬁce of the Secretary
of Defense, 1989–1993) and Stephen Bryen (Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, 1981–1988) (US Senate, 1998a, 1998b).
2.3 The private sector
The major US high-tech companies lobbied the government both indi-
vidually and through business associations to obtain the liberalization of
7 Interviews with ofﬁcials in the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and State, andwith com-
puter industry lobbyists (March–December 2010).
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controls export to China, therefore pressing in the same direction as the
Run Faster coalition (although, in their case, exclusively on economic
grounds). The computer industry worked primarily through the Computer
Systems Policy Project (CSPP) to organize its lobbying effort. The CSPP
included the CEOs of the largest US computer companies: Apple
Computer, AT&T, Compaq, Cray, Data General, Digital Equipment,
Hewlett–Packard, Silicon Graphics, Straus Computer, Sun Microsystems,
Unisys as well as the law ﬁrm Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering. According to
a computer industry lobbyist, ‘the CSPP was the most effective and visible’
lobbying group on supercomputer export controls and ‘it was aimed pri-
marily at exports to China. […] The CEOs themselves would meet with
members of Congress, with the Commerce and Defense Departments,
once met with Clinton and with John Podesta. […] It was a very effective
lobbying campaign […] because of the connections through the CSPP,
through the CEOs, who had access to all of this people’ (lobbyist, inter-
view, October 2010). The CSPP, in turn, coalesced into broader coalitions,
so called broad spectrum associations, such as the National Association
of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade Council, and the Coalition
for Employment through Exports. These groups represented awider range
of interests than merely sectoral interests. They tended to focus on the
overall reform of US export controls (such as the reform of the Export
Administration Act legislation) rather than on the regulatory changes
of controls for speciﬁc technologies, which were delegated to sectoral busi-
ness associations (e.g. the CSPP). In addition, throughout the 1990s, the
President Export Council, chaired by Presidentially appointed Michael
Armstrong, CEO of Hughes Electronics (1992–1997), included CEOs of
major US high-tech companies and provided them with a forum in which
to discuss export-related matters with high-level ofﬁcials and from which
present policy recommendations (Table 3).
2.4 The policy outcome: loosening supercomputer
export controls
Throughout the 1990s, the Run Faster coalition competed with the
Control Hawks and pressed for loosening of export controls on both na-
tional security and economic grounds. It will be shown that, in the area of
supercomputers, the Run Faster coalition was able to overcome the resist-
ance and opposition of the Control Hawks and to signiﬁcantly liberalize
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supercomputer export controls. In 1993, the Run Faster coalition began
the relaxation of controls on computer exports to China (and other con-
trolled countries) for computers with a data processing speed of up to 67
million theoretical operations per second, or MTOPS. A declassiﬁed brief-
ing paper speciﬁes that this liberalization ‘released computers and related
equipment from licensing requirements for which the Commerce
Department received ∼$1.5 billion worth of IVL [Individual Validated
Export Licenses] applications in 1993’ (DOC, 1994a). Controls on compu-
ters were then further liberalized in January 1994 up to 260 MTOPs
‘thereby freeing up most lower-level computers, including many Silicon
Graphic, Sun, Hewlett Packard, DEC, and IBM workstations from USG
[US government] approval’ (DOC, 1994b). This decontrol released an add-
itional $69 million worth of computers to China (DOC, 1994a). These
regulatory changes started a process of gradual and constant liberalization
of the control levels on the export of computers. The control parameters
were raised on a regular basis between 1993 and 2002 (Fig. 1).
In 1996, the Commerce Department removed license requirements for
supercomputer exports with performance levels up to 2.000 MTOPS and,
as shown in Figures 2 and 3, organized target countries into four tiers with
increasing levels of controls. This tier system was meant to ‘permit the gov-
ernment to tailor control levels and licensing conditions to the national se-
curity or proliferation risk posed at a speciﬁc destination’ (GAO, 1998b:
2). Tier 3 countries, in particular, included China, Russia, India, Pakistan,
and Israel, where there was a risk of proliferation or diversion. For these
countries, a dual control system was established which distinguished
between civilian and military end-users and end-uses. HPCs up to 7.000
Table 3 Key business associations
OVERALL EXPORT CONTROL REFORM
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)
National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC)
Coalition for Employment through Exports (CEE)
OTHER VEHICLES FOR THE INDUSTRY’S LOBBYING EFFORTS
President Export Council (PEC)
SECTORAL BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP)
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MTOPS could be exported to civilian end-users without a license, while
exports at and above 2.000 MTOPS to end-users of concern for military or
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction reasons required a license
(Figs. 2 and 3).
Overall, the 1996 liberalization provided ‘signiﬁcant beneﬁt to the inter-
national competitiveness of the US computer industry and [affected] an
estimated $10 billion in exports’ (DOC, 1996: II-2). Indeed, as a conse-
quence of the relaxation of controls, American exports of supercomputers
burgeoned throughout the 1990s. In terms of sales to China, between 1997
and 1999, the United States approved the export of 1,924 supercomputers
to the PRC (Table 4) (GAO, 1999: 4). China ranked as the largest importer
of US HPC between 1996 and 1999 in Tier 3 (GAO, 1998a: 5 and 1999:
15). Russia, Israel, and Saudi Arabiawere the next three largest authorized
importers of US supercomputers. The volume of computers sold to China
exceeded the sum of those exported to the latter three.
2.5 The Run faster coalition’s rationale for streamlining
export controls
As shown earlier, the liberalization of supercomputer export controls by
the Run Faster coalition affected all countries and was tailored, through
Figure 1 Changes in the US export control threshold for high performance computers,
1993–2002 (measured in MTOPs).
Source: General Accounting Ofﬁce (2002) Export Controls: More Thorough Analysis Needed
to Justify Changes in High Performance Computer Controls, August, GAO-02-892.
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the Tier system, to the national security concerns posed by each individual
country. Nevertheless, Tier 3 – and within it China in particular – was the
central focus of the reform effort both from a national security and an eco-
nomic standpoint. As then Director of the Pentagon’s DTSA David
Tarbell explains, China ‘was the central focus for national security. Most
of the discussion for China revolved around its military modernization.
The computer control were matched precisely with what we estimated
were Chinese capabilities. From a national security standpoint, it was en-
tirely driven by China’ (interview, May 2010). As already mentioned,
supercomputers could indeed be used by the PLA for a broad range of
both military and intelligence applications. At the same time, from an
Figure 2 The tier system (a).
Source:McLoughlin G., Fergusson I., 2005, High Performance Computers and Export
Control Policy,Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
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economic perspective, China was also the focal point of interest. Tarbell
points out that, throughout the 1990s,
anytime there was a discussion about export reform […] with the busi-
ness community it was always about the Chinese market, it was always
one of their ﬁrst talking points from a commercial, economic and
Figure 3 The tier system (b).
Source: adapted from The Proliferation Primer, A Majority Report of the Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, US Senate, January 1998.
Table 4 Computers approved by the US government for export to Tier 3 countries: 18
November 1997–27 August 1999 (total approved exports)
Country Quantity Average MTOPs Highest MTOPs level
China 1,924 3,610.6 24,750
Russia 503 3,624.4 16,063
Israel 458 3,857.8 10,440
Saudi Arabia 212 9,973.2 28,980
United Arab Emirates 191 3,519.6 12,063
Algeria 117 2,228.1 5,460
India 113 3,449.5 11,873
Source: General Accounting Ofﬁce, 1999, Export Controls: Statutory Reporting Requirements
for Computers Not Fully Addressed, November, GAO/NSIAD-00-45.
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competitiveness standpoint. […] The opportunities in China in terms of
proﬁts, exports, and job creation in the US were the primary motive
that led US high-tech industry to push for the liberalization of US
export controls (interview, May 2010)
James Jochum, then International Trade Counsel and Legislative Director
for Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), and later Assistant Secretary of
Commerce (2001–2005), synthesizes the importance of China in the debates
over supercomputer export controls as follows:
In the background, Chinawas really the entire issue. Most of our export
controls fell on Tier 3 countries, and so when you are talking about re-
moving export controls, you are really talking about liberalizing con-
trols to Tier 3. You were essentially talking about China. Russia was
also in Tier 3, but the most of the exports in Tier 3 were to China. There
were India and Russia too [in Tier 3], but China bought more compu-
ters than Russia and India combined [cf. Table 4]. So what we are really
talking about was the regulatory standard for exports to China. (inter-
view, March, 2010)
Speciﬁcally, the Run Faster coalition’s decision to liberalize the controls on
supercomputer exports to China and other controlled destinations was
based on the following interrelated considerations.
First, with the computational capabilities of commercially developed
information technology doubling every 18 months, as stated by the so-
called Moore’s law, Cold War export controls had become outdated.8
Richard Van Atta, then Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Dual Use and Commercial Programs explains that ‘the Moore’s law
implied that the levels of commercially available computer technology was
always pushing beyond the levels of controls, and that the controls were
always behind the growth in computing power’ (interview, May 2010).
8 Interviews with William Clements, Director of Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the
NSC (1993–1995), March 2010; William Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce Export
Administration (1994–2001), March 2010; David Tarbell, Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Technology Security Policy and Director of DTSA (1994–2001), May 2010;
Maureen Tucker, Chief of Staff to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration (1988–1996), April 2010; Mitchel Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counterproliferation Policy and Senior Representative for Trade Security Policy
(1993–1997), March 2010.
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A second factor was the development of ‘parallel processing’ (or paral-
lel computing).9 According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS),
‘by the 1990s, commercial users began to more commonly link several
computers with multiple processing capability together’ (CRS, 2005: 3–4).
Through this process, called ‘parallel computing,’ several independent
computers are linked together by a single system of software, hardware,
and network technologies, which allow many microprocessors to work
simultaneously. This blurred the difference between supercomputers and
mass market computers. Commercially available microprocessors that in-
dividually complied with existing export regulations could now be linked
to create servers with capabilities well beyond existing supercomputer
export control thresholds. The Run Faster coalition therefore concluded
that, as parallel processing capabilities were widely available, this had
greatly reduced the capacity of the United States to control the diffusion
supercomputers and therefore made US export controls increasingly inef-
fective (Reinsch in US Senate, 1998: 26).
Third, the global diffusion of high computing capabilities meant that
China and other countries targeted by US export controls could purchase
the controlled items in foreign countries that did not impose the same level
of controls than the United States.10 The microprocessors on which super-
computing relied had indeed become increasingly available on the com-
mercial market and globally widespread, including from countries not
supporting US export control policies or outside the multilateral export
control regime. The percentage of the world’s 500 most powerful super-
computers employing commercially available microprocessors had grown
from ∼10% in 1993 to 75% in 1997 (Goodman et al., 1998: 14). And as
Under Secretary of Commerce Reinsch (1994–2001) explains, ‘the basic
ingredients, the chips, the microprocessors [were] widely available and
manufactured all over Asia and Europe by a variety of companies’
(US Congress, 1998: 5). In Asia, beside Japan, with whom the United
States had an export control agreement (the ‘Supercomputer Regime’),
other countries had become a source for China’s acquisition of computer
technology (e.g. semiconductors), such as Taiwan, South Korea and
Malaysia (GAO, 2006a: 30). As a consequence, according to William
Clements, Director of Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the NSC,
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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‘the chips became ubiquitous, you could not control them. […] The
technological advances simply made the [foreign] availability of computa-
tional capability so diffuse that it became impossible to control. […] You
just lost control’ (interview, March, 2010). Similarly, in the words of Under
Secretary of Commerce Reinsch ‘however much we would like to have it
otherwise, we must not delude ourselves: we cannot control the uncontrol-
lable’ (US HR, 1997: 6).
Finally, given the growing commercialization of the Pentagon’s indus-
trial base, the Run Faster coalition considered that excessively stringent
controls would ‘seriously damage our national security by crippling our
companies just as our national security establishment’s reliance on them
grows’ (Reinsch in US Senate, 1998: 25). In his words, ‘you have the situ-
ation where the Pentagon needs IBM more than IBM needs the Pentagon.
[…] So the next step is how do you keep IBM healthy and proﬁtable? And
there is only one way: exports’ (interview, March, 2010). Accordingly,
‘maximizing our technological leadership in this sector will inevitably have
more to do with making sure we are running faster than our adversaries
than it will with trying to hold them back’ (Reinsch, 1999: 3). US national
security would therefore be better served by liberalizing export controls on
supercomputers which would support the health of US high-tech industry
and, in turn, its ability to provide state-of-the-art dual-use technology to
the US military.
2.6 Growing intercoalitions rivalry: the Cox report
After the Republicans gained the majority both in the HR and in the
Senate in the mid-1990s, numerous Congressmen increasingly voiced their
concerns over the impact of the Clinton administration’s supercomputer
decontrols on China’s military modernization. The issue of technology
transfers to PRC became highly politicized and enmeshed in partisan
politics thereby polarizing Congress.
The Control Hawks in Congress ﬁercely criticized the liberalization of
HPC export controls. Representative Floyd Spence, Chairman of the
Committee on National Security, complained that, since the export control
liberalizations, US supercomputers had ‘been inappropriately shipped to
military research facilities in China [and] that these unauthorized transfers
have been facilitated, if not encouraged, by the administration’s own relax-
ation of supercomputers export controls’ (US HR, 1997: 1–2). Numerous
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hearings were held both in the HRs and the Senate to examine the national
security implications of US export control policy on supercomputers and
China (US HR, 1997; US Senate, 1997; Congress, 1998; US Senate, 1998).
Gary Milhollin, the head of the Wisconsin Project think tank, wrote
critical articles in The Washington Post such as ‘With Looser Computer
Controls We’re Selling Our Safety Short’ (2000). Similarly, in a testimony
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense under Reagan, Stephen Bryen, stated: ‘the sale of
supercomputers to China should be regarded as a crazy policy’ (US Senate,
1997: 41).
In 1998, the HR created the Select Committee on US National Security
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the PRC to investigate over the
allegations reported in the press that, in the aftermath of launch failures of
US satellites in China (manufactured by Loral and Hughes), unauthorized
information had been transferred to Chinese engineers. As a former
Congressional Staffer of Senator John McCain puts it, ‘once it became
known, Congress went at war’ (interview, October 2010). The mandate of
the so-called Cox Committee, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox
(R-CA), did not focus exclusively on satellite launches but on any illicit
technology transfer and diversion to the PRC, including supercomputers.
The Committee released its ﬁnal report on US technology transfers to
China, the so-called Cox Report, in January 1999, which remains classi-
ﬁed. The unclassiﬁed version of the report was released in May 1999.
Among its main conclusions, the report stated that, in the aftermath of the
failed satellite launches, the ﬁrms Hughes and Loral had transferred
missile design and information know-how to the Chinese without the US
government required export license. Furthermore, China was believed
of having pursued large-scale intelligence collection, espionage and inter-
actions with US scientists from the Department of Energy’s national la-
boratories and stolen classiﬁed information on the most advanced US
thermonuclear weapons. Overall, the Cox report accused China of having
illegally obtained US missile, space and nuclear technology in order to
improve the PLA military and intelligence capabilities (Kan, 1999). As far
as HPCs were concerned, the report stated that the relaxation of export
controls on supercomputers to China had provided the PLAwith increased
computing power and speed and that the US government had no effective
way to verify that supercomputers reportedly acquired for commercial
purposes were not diverted to military end-uses because of the Chinese
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government resistance to allow post-shipment on-site veriﬁcation visits
(Fig. 4).11
In response to the Control Hawks’ vocal concerns over the risks of
supercomputer diversion to military end-users and end-uses in China,
Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
Fiscal Year (FY) 1998. The legislation (in particular Section 1211) tigh-
tened the informational requirements related to supercomputer exports
controls to Tier 3 countries (US Congress, 1997). First, it established
requirements for advanced notiﬁcation by the exporters as well as for post-
shipment veriﬁcations. Second, in order to raise liberalize supercomputer
export controls, the President would have to justify the new control param-
eter in a written report to be submitted to Congress. Third, the President
would have the authority to move countries out from Tier 3 to other Tiers,
with a prior notiﬁcation to Congress, but not if (i) the country was nuclear
weapons state and not a member of NATO and (ii) the country was a signa-
tory of Non-Proliferation Treaty and listed in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (US Congress, 2000). In the words of William Greenwalt,
Professional Staff Member in the Senate Armed Services Committee, this
third provision was ‘directed right at the Chinese,’ at making sure that China
would not be moved out from Tier 3 (interview, May 2010). In fact, according
Figure 4 Box: The cox report’s recommendations on supercomputer expert controls.
11 The conclusions of the Cox Report were however controversial and a 1999 DOC report
denied many of its ﬁndings: ‘there is no evidence that the computers being used [in Chinese
nuclear laboratories] are US made HPCs or that they have been diverted to such end-uses.
[…] The [Cox] report cites a number of hypothetical cases where the Chinese could be using
computers for military purposes. Most of these applications could be performed on commer-
cially available workstations and personal computers. They do not require supercomputers’
(DOC, 1999: 13).
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to a number of interviewees, the whole NDAA provisions on export controls
de facto targeted China. Although the language of the legislation did not spe-
ciﬁcally mention China, the focus of the NDAAwas clearly ‘an anti-China
issue’ (interviews with Greenwalt and with lobbyist, October 2010). The Run
Faster coalition strongly opposed the NDAA requirements. Under Secretary
of Commerce Reinsch expressed his discontent in a testimony before the
National Security Committee, chaired by Fred Thompson, arguing that these
provisions made ‘no technical sense’ and were an attempt by the Congress to
‘micromanage export control policy’ (US HR, 1997: 6–7). Similar concerns
were expressed by key political appointees in the Pentagon (Wallerstein in US
Congress, 1997). Nevertheless, in 1999, despite the Run Faster coalition’s op-
position, the Congress passed the 2000 NDAA which further required the
President to submit a report to Congress that would (i) assess the cumulative
impact of licenses of military-related technologies granted to countries and
entities of concern and (ii) conduct a comprehensive review of the national
security implications of exporting supercomputers to China.
Nonetheless, these legislative provisions did not give to the Congress a
veto right on export control liberalizations. They just imposed upon the
President an informational requirement. In fact, despite the political up-
heaval generated by the Cox Committee, the acrimonious tensions over
the various NDAA provisions, and the attempts by the Control Hawks to
reimpose stringent restrictions on supercomputer exports, the liberaliza-
tion of computer controls continued in the last years of the Clinton admin-
istration. Indeed, throughout 1999 up until January 2001, the distinction
between civilian and military end-users was dropped and the steady liber-
alization of supercomputer export controls continued, raising the thresh-
olds up to 85,000 MTOPs (cf. Fig. 1). The Run Faster coalition was
therefore able, despite the opposition of the Control Hawks, to pursue the
liberalization of supercomputer export controls to China, and other Tier 3
countries, until the very last month of the Clinton administration – which
continued apace during the George W. Bush administration.
3. The making of US export control policy toward
China during the George W. Bush administration
The Bush administration’s ﬁrst change to HPC export controls was announced
on 2 January 2002, and took effect on March 5. The controls threshold for
Tier 3 countries (such as China, Russia, and India) was raised from 85,000 to
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190,000 MTOPs (Fergusson and McLoughlin, 2006: 13). Having described
the opposition of the Control Hawks to this loosening of US supercomputer
export controls, this section examines the changing bureaucratic politics of
the Bush administration. It will be shown that despite an overall more conser-
vative approach to export control policy of the Bush administration relative to
its predecessor, and despite initially strong interagency disagreements, a con-
sensus gradually emerged within the interagency debates on supercomputer
export controls around the key tenets of the Run Faster coalition. This, in
turn, eventually resulted in a liberalization of US export controls on super-
computers that continued in the second half of the 2000s, thereby attesting the
preponderance of the Run Faster coalition over the Control Hawks in the ﬁrst
decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
3.1 The control hawks’ opposition to the liberalization
of controls
Several key Control Hawks – most notably in Congress (see Table 5) –
opposed the liberalization of export controls to China throughout the
2000s, as they had done in the 1990s. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Export Administration (2003–2006) Peter Lichtenbaum speciﬁes that
within Congress ‘there was a lot of uncertainty regarding Chinese military
intentions and a desire to err on the side of caution when exporting sensitive
technologies the Chinese military might be able to get some advantage
from.’12 According to William Reinsch, President of the NFTC (2001–
present), ‘the administration came under pressure on the Hill, from [the
Chairman of the House International Relations Committee (R-IL, 2001–
2007)] Henry Hyde among others, to do something about China. Hyde was
in the group of very conservative Republicans who supported much stronger
controls and pressed the administration to do something about that’ (inter-
view, March, 2010). During a Congressional hearing, Republican Senator
Fred Thompson (R-TN), member of the Select Committee on Intelligence
(2001–2002) and former Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee
(1997–2001), strongly criticized the two core tenets of the Run Faster coali-
tion brought forward to justify the liberalization of supercomputers: ﬁrst,
the growing inability of the United States to control the diffusion of
supercomputer-related technology and, second, the idea that excessively
12 Peter Lichtenbaum, interview, 6 April 2010.
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stringent export controls would undermine the ability of the United States
to run faster than its competitors and, thereby, US national security. On the
ﬁrst point, he stated that with ‘our greatly liberalized export policy with
regard to dual-use items and, in particular, high performance computers
[…] we continue to go down the same path blindly,’ ‘with industry pounding
on our doors every day, trying to liberalize export controls further, arguing
that there is no need to try to control anything, ever, anymore, anywhere. We
are talking about Tier 3 countries here. If really you cannot control anything
anymore, why control Tier 4 countries? Why not go ahead and send compu-
ters to Syria and Libya, if, in fact, there is nothing we can do at any stage?’
(Thompson, 2001: 3–5). On the second point, he stressed that ‘it is even
more difﬁcult to believe [the] argument that the US military will be harmed
if US ﬁrms can’t reinvest these marginal proﬁts gained from Tier 3 sales
back into R&D programs that might produce military-ready ‘off the shelf ’
technology. This makes little sense.’13 Similarly, in 2002, Gary Milhollin,
Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control think tank,
voiced his concerns that ‘there are virtually no longer any meaningful con-
trols on the export of high-performance computers. […] The result is that
America will have given up its advantage over other countries in a vital stra-
tegic technology’ (2002: 1073). However, as detailed later, despite the initial
Table 5 Key Control Hawks in congress during the 2000s
Name Position Year
US House of Representatives
Henry Hyde (R-IL) Chairman of the Committee on International
Relations (renamed Foreign Affairs Committee
since 2007)
2001–2007
Duncan Hunter (R-CA) Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services 2003–2007
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) Chairman of the Space and Aeronautics
Subcommittee of the Science Committee
1997–2005
US Senate
John Warner (R-VA) Chairman of the Armed Services Committee 2003–2007
Richard Shelby (R-AL) Chairman of the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs
2003–2007
Jon Kyl (R-AZ) Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee 2003–2007
Richard Lugar (R-IN) Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee 2003–2007
13 Ibid.
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opposition of the Control Hawks, a consensus gradually emerged within the
administration over the need to change supercomputer export controls in
line with the key tenets of the Run Faster coalition.
3.2 The bureaucratic politics of the Bush administration
As previously shown, in the 1990s, the position of the Pentagon and the
broader bureaucratic dynamics in the making of US export control policy
had changed substantially relative to the 1980s. The senior ofﬁcials within
Pentagon and the NSC sidedwith the Commerce Department in supporting
the streamlining of US export controls. Under the G. W. Bush administra-
tion, the bureaucratic politics within the triumvirate partly returned to a
more ‘traditional’ triangular pattern, with the Pentagon being in favor of
more stringent controls than the Commerce Department, and the State
Department often acting as a broker between the two. According to former
Under Secretary of Commerce William Reinsch (1994–2001) and then
President of the National Foreign Trade Council (2001–present), under the
Bush administration, the Commerce Department had less incentives to
conduct interbureaucratic ﬁghts ‘as going up the ladder was not going to
produce a victory’ given the resistance of the Pentagon and the NSC (inter-
view, March, 2010). Furthermore, the Commerce Department itself signaled
a somewhat more conservative approach than during the previous adminis-
tration by changing its title, in 2002, from Bureau of Export Administration
to Bureau of Industry and Security. According to James Jochum, Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration (2001–2003), the name
of the bureau was changed in order ‘to reﬂect the fact that even though we
were in the Commerce Department, our mandate was national security-
driven’ (interview, March, 2010).
3.2.1 Interagency debates over supercomputer exports to China: toward a
consensus.
Just like in the 1990s, the deliberations over supercomputer export controls
affected a broad range of countries and were tailored, through the tier system,
to the national security concerns posed by each individual country.
Nevertheless, Tier 3 – and within it China in particular – was the key focus
both from a national security and from an economic standpoint. The
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration (2001–2003)
highlights the economic relevance of China in the interagency discussions
over loosening supercomputer export controls: ‘the whole debate really was
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about China. So from a commercial standpoint, the emerging market in
China was a huge issue’ (interview, March, 2010). China was indeed the
largest single export market among the controlled country group in the early
2000s, with over 79% of the total and Russia ranking a distant second with
11% of the total (DOC, 2002: 110). At the same time, within the DOD,
China was also seen as a core security concern in the debates of supercom-
puter export controls, as attested by the Pentagon’s annual reports on the
modernization of the PLA (DOD, 2007) by former DOD ofﬁcials’ accounts.
Roy Kamphausen, China Branch Chief in the Directorate for Strategic Plans
and Policy (J5) of the Joint Staff (2001–2003) and then Country Director for
China, Mongolia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in the Ofﬁce of the Secretary of
Defense (2003–2004), characterizes the Pentagon’s view of the PLA’s modern-
ization in the early 2000s as follows: ‘that was a period of time in which
China’s military modernization was becoming of more concern to the
Pentagon, and in particular the idea that China was wanting to implement
Network Centric Warfare, which was essentially how to use information tech-
nology to improve situational awareness and cue targeting systems, and in the
end result in much more accurate targeting and destruction. […] The concern
was that [through the acquisition of dual-use technologies] they would be in a
much better position to facilitate their transition to information-centered
warfare’ (interview, March, 2010). Similarly, according to the Director of the
State Department’s Ofﬁce of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction and rep-
resentative of the United States at the Wassenaar Arrangement (2002–2008),
initially ‘the Department of Defense, and speciﬁcally the Defense Technology
Security Administration [DTSA, the agency in charge of export controls],
was strongly opposed to transfers of any sophisticated computer technology,
including software, to the PRC. China was the red ﬂag that the opponents of
changes to controls wouldwaive’ (interview, April 2010).
Over time, however, the various departments came to share the view
that the existing export control thresholds were not workable and the
Pentagon agreed that such controls had become ineffective.14 After numer-
ous interagency meetings, the Pentagon came to the view that excessively
stringent controls would be ineffective and potentially counterproductive
in terms of weakening the US high-tech industrial base and that they
should therefore be focused exclusively on ‘chokepoints of technology’,
namely those technologies that the Chinese were not yet able to produce
14 Interviews with ofﬁcials in the Departments of State and Commerce (March and April 2010).
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and that only the United States could supply and therefore effectively
control.15 The supercomputers that fell into the category of ‘chokepoint’
technology were only those at the extremely high MTOP levels, which
were not available on the commercial market. Realizing the need to take
into account the technological and industrial dynamics in the computer
market and to maintain effective export controls, the Pentagon therefore
consented to the liberalization of supercomputers while assuring that the
highest-end systems, those above the 190,000 MTOPs threshold, would
still be controlled (see Fig. 1).
3.3 Key considerations in the streamlining of supercomputers
export controls
A consensus therefore gradually emerged among the key actors of the Bush
administration (Table 6) over the need to streamline US supercomputer
export controls to Tier 3 countries in line with the key tenets of the Run
Faster coalition. Indeed, the considerations that drove the loosening of these
controls echo very closely those that shaped US policy in the 1990s.
First, the rapidly and continuously increasing computers’ performances,
described by theMoore’s law, required to adapt outdated US export controls
to the rapid advancement of technology by raising the control threshold in
line with the evolutions of worldwide available computing power.16
Second, the administration considered that the effectiveness of US export
controls was being eroded by market and technological changes in the
microprocessor and computer industries (GAO, 2006b: 1). As noted earlier,
with parallel processing, microprocessors that individually complied with
US export regulations could be linked together to create servers with com-
puting capabilities that approach those of a supercomputer and breach US
export control thresholds.17 Accordingly, as a General Accounting Ofﬁce
15 Interviews with ofﬁcials in the Departments of Defense and Commerce (March and
December 2010).
16 Interviews with Karan Bhatia, Chief Counsel in the Department of Commerce’s Export
Administration Bureau (2001–2002), then Deputy Under Secretary for Industry and Security
from 2002 to 2003 (October 2010), and Robert Joseph, Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counter-Proliferation and Homeland Defense at
National Security Council from 2001 to 2005 (November 2010).
17 The impact of parallel processing on the computer liberalizations in the 2000s was stressed by
James Jochum, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration from 2001 to
2003 (March 2010) and Matthew Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce of
Export Administration (2001–present) (December 2010). See also General Accounting
Ofﬁce, 2006.
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report puts it, the existing export control thresholds for supercomputers
were ‘not effective in limiting countries of concern from obtaining high per-
formance computing capabilities for military applications’ (GAO, 2000: 20).
Table 6 Key executive branch actors in the 2000s
Name Position Year
National Security Council
Maureen Tuckera Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls 1996–2006
Angelo Changa Director for Counterproliferation Strategy 2006–2008
Department of Commerce
Kenneth Juster Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security 2001–2005
David McCormicka Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security 2005–2006
Mario Mancusoa Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security 2007–2008
Peter Lichtenbauma Assistant Secretary for Export Administration 2003–2006
Christopher Padillaa Assistant Secretary for Export Administration 2006–2007
Matthew Bormana Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration 2001–present
Bernard Kritzera Director of the Commerce Department’s Ofﬁce of
Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls
2002–2006
Director of the Ofﬁce of National Security and
Technology Transfer Controls
2007–2008
Department of Defense
Douglas Feith Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 2001–2005
Eric Edelman Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 2005–2009
Lisa Bronson Deputy Under Secretary for Technology Security Policy
and Director of DTSA
2001–2005
Beth McCormicka Deputy Under Secretary for Technology Security Policy
and Director of DTSA
2007–2008
Deputy Director (August–September) and then Director
(from October) of DTSA
2005–2006
Department of State
John Bolton Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton
2001–2005
Francis Recorda Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International
Security and Nonproliferation
2005–2006
John Rood Assistant Secretary of State for International Security
and Nonproliferation
2006–2007
Christian Kesslera Director of the State Department’s Ofﬁce of
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction
2002–2008
aInterviewed by the author.
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Third, and relatedly, the global diffusion of technology and the foreign
availability of supercomputer components also contributed to make US
export controls increasingly ineffective. In the words of Maureen Tucker,
Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls at the National
Security Council (1996–2006), ‘the ability to control effectively [the diffu-
sion of technology] was very key in those discussions. And the more wide-
spread the technology, the less effective the controls. There was a general
recognition that the technology was outstripping our ability to control it
effectively’ (interview, March, 2012).
Fourth, China’s growing indigenous capabilities in the ﬁeld of super-
computing was an additional factor that weakened the effectiveness of
existing US export controls and was therefore taken into consideration
in the liberalization of controls.18 In the early 2000s, China super-
computing capabilities signiﬁcantly increased. In 2003, for instance,
several supercomputer centers, the largest of which being the Computer
Network Information Center at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, pro-
vided China with the domestic capability to build fast supercomputers.
By November of that year, China had nine supercomputers on the
Top500 list.19 Its most powerful HPC was the DeepComp 6,800, based
on a commodity cluster model and built by the Chinese Legend Group
Corporation. It ranked 14th on the Top500 list of most powerful super-
computers, preceded by supercomputers deployed in the United States
and Japan. Francine Berman, then Director of the San Diego Super-
computer Center (2001–2009), stated before the US–China Commission
that ‘the rapid march of technology is perhaps the largest factor affecting
supercomputing in China. With the success of commodity cluster super-
computers, which China can build […] China has a growing super-
computing capability, increasingly independent of US export policies’
(USCC 2004: 144–145).
Finally, in line with a key tenet of the Run Faster coalition, the loosening
of the controls on supercomputer exports was also based upon the belief
that excessively stringent controls, by reducing the export revenues that US
high-tech ﬁrms could reinvest into R&D on next-generation technologies,
would weaken the ability of the Pentagon to access state-of-the-art
18 Matthew Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration
(2001–present), interview, December 2010.
19 www.top500.org.
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technologies. Streamlining the current export control system was therefore
deemed necessary to sustain the ability of the United States to maintain its
technological/military lead and to run faster than potential competitors. In
other words, overly restrictive export controls would hamper the ability of
the United States to maintain a technological/military edge and thereby
weaken US national security. For Matthew Borman, then Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Commerce of Export Administration (2001–present), ‘the con-
sequence of continuing to control [supercomputers] at those lower levels
would have been adverse in a indirect way to the national security and eco-
nomic security because you are disadvantaging US companies, which could
ultimately impact their ability to provide the US with high performance
computers for national security applications’ (interview, December 2010).
The Director of the National Security Agency (2001–2005) and then of the
Central Intelligence Agency (2006–2009), General Michael Hayden, con-
ﬁrms that given that the NSA is highly dependent upon HPCs for crypt-
analysis (breaking of codes) and cryptography (making of codes), the issue
of supercomputer export controls was ‘very important for the NSA. In
essence, we had to decide what would be better for the NSA. We decided
that the actual level of restrictions countered the interests of the NSA. The
limits were so much hurting the computing industry that it would be better
to export higher quality machines if this meant the better health of the US
industrial base’ (interview, December 2010). The Pentagon and its cryptolo-
gic agency, the NSA, therefore supported the change in export control regu-
lation in order to sustain the health of the Pentagon’s commercial industrial
base and thereby to protect US national security.
In sum, the combination of increasingly ineffective export controls on
supercomputers – due to the technological dynamics in the computing
market, to China’s growing indigenous capabilities, and to the foreign
availability of key components from non-US suppliers – and the need to
protect US national security by supporting the health of the high-tech in-
dustrial base on which the Pentagon relied drove the liberalization of
supercomputer exports to China during the Bush administration.
3.4 The computer industry’s interests and lobbying efforts
Just like in the 1990s, the computer industry lobbied the government to
loosen supercomputer export controls through the Computer Science
Policy Project (CSPP, see Table 3) but also through its subsidiary, the
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Computer Coalition for Responsible Exports (CCREs).20 The CCRE had
been created in 1999, in the aftermath of the 1998 NDAA. It included the
CSPP’s companies and a number of trade associations, such as Apple,
Compaq, Data General, Dell, Hewlett–Packard, IBM, Intel, NCR
Corporation, Silicon Graphics, Sun Microsystems, Unisys, the American
Electronics Association, the Computer and Communications Industry
Association, and the Information Technology Industry Council (ITI). As
explained by a lobbyist involved in these deliberations, the computer in-
dustry through the CSPP ‘did a very good job of sitting down with the
White House and with the Defense Department, at high levels, to talk
about controls’ (interview, October 2010). While the CSPP’s CEOs had
meetings with senior ofﬁcials, the CCRE was meant as a subsidiary, as a
separate group to lobby lower echelons of the bureaucracy where the more
technical issues related to supercomputer export controls would be dis-
cussed. The industry’s key arguments for convincing the administration to
liberalize HPC export controls were the constantly increasing computa-
tional capabilities of computers, the ‘uncontrollability’ of supercomputers
because of their foreign availability and the need not to put the US
industry at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign competitors
(Hoydysh, 2001: 24–33).
In 2006, the Bush administration pursued the streamlining of supercom-
puter export controls by setting a new control threshold for deﬁning a
‘supercomputer’ and a new formula for calculating computer performance
that would replace the MTOPs metric.21 This further liberalization com-
pleted the changes made to supercomputer export controls in the 1990s and
early 2000s and removed most obstacles to the computer industry’s exports
to China, except for the most powerful supercomputers used in critical
national security applications by the Pentagon and the Department of
Energy’s laboratories. In the words of a lobbyist for the computer industry,
the export controls on supercomputers were liberalized ‘to such a point that
it basically took care of most of the licenses; the number of licenses dropped
dramatically. Very little [computer exports now] require a license’ (interview,
October 2010). The streamlining of American export controls in the 2000s
had a signiﬁcant impact on US supercomputer exports to China. The
20 Interviews with lobbyists for the computer industry, October 2010. On October 2005, the
CSPP changed its name to Technology CEO Council.
21 The new formulawas Adjusted Peak Performance, expressed in weighted Teraﬂops.
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General Accounting Ofﬁce stressed, in a 2002 report, that the liberalizations
of controls on supercomputers that had taken place in the Clinton and Bush
administrations resulted in a ‘nearly thousandfold increase’ in the export
control threshold over the eight-year period stressing that ‘most of these
changes have occurred over the last 2 years,’ referring to Clinton’s 2000–
2001 and Bush’s 2002 liberalizations (GAO, 2002: 6). The annual report of
the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) also
emphasized the fact that by 2002 the Commerce Department’s licensing sta-
tistics suggested ‘that most of the trade in high performance computing is
no longer licensed and monitored’ (USCC, 2002: Ch. 10). In 2000, only 23
license applications for controlled computers were approved to China for a
total of $10,939,033, and in 2001, two applications were approved for a total
of $3,942,456. These ﬁgures attest the scale of the liberalization of super-
computer export controls to the PRC.22 The successive loosening of HPC
export controls in 2002 and 2006 eliminated, in the words of a lobbyist,
‘most of the stress from the system’ (interview, October 2010). This testiﬁes
the continued ability of the Run Faster coalition to prevail over the Control
Hawks in the making of supercomputer export controls to China in the
post-ColdWar era.
4. Conclusion
Through a sociology of decision making and a strong focus on primary
sources, this paper has sought to examine the evolving competition
between the coalitions of state and societal actors involved in the making
Washington’s export control policy toward Beijing. The two coalitions cut
across bureaucratic players (including both political appointees and career
ofﬁcials), Congressmen and their staffers, business representatives, and the
media. The Run Faster coalition comprises key actors in the NSC and the
Department of Commerce, a number of senior political appointees in the
Pentagon, as well as a limited number of Congressmen (both Democrats
and Republicans), with the US high-tech industry and its business associa-
tions pressing in the same direction of these governmental ofﬁcials. On the
other side of the spectrum, the Control Hawks include a number key
Republican Congressmen and their staffers in both the HRs and the
22 Ibid. The number of license applications and the value of the licensed trade in computer were
lower than the previous year because the liberalization of controls on computer exports to
China meant that less transactions required licenses.
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Senate, DOD career ofﬁcials, nonproliferation think tanks, newspaper
journalists, and inﬂuential former government ofﬁcials. These two coali-
tions have acutely diverging perspectives of the nexus between the national
security and economic interests at stake in US–China relations. On the one
hand, the Control Hawks frame their argument in the Cold War paradigm
of a trade-off between national security and economic interests. On the
other, because of the erosion of the US capacity to restrict the diffusion of
defense-related technology and of the commercialization of the Pentagon’s
industrial base, the Run Faster coalition reassesses the security/economic
calculus in the making of US policy toward China by moving beyond the
trade-off between the two. In the post-Cold War era, although the Control
Hawks were able to impose additional informational requirements for
export control changes, the Run Faster coalition prevailed and was able to
pursue a major liberalization of supercomputer export controls to China
during the 1990s and 2000s.
The Obama administration’s reform of the American export control
system further attests the growing tendency in Washington to move beyond
the Cold War trade-off between national security and economics in US
strategic trade with potential competitors (for details on this reform, see
Meijer, 2013b). The Obama administration’s reform initiative builds upon
a core premise of the Run Faster coalition, namely that ‘the Cold War
mentality of ‘Fortress America’ cripples our ability to confront the very
real dangers of altered world conditions […]. The United States runs the
risk of becoming less competitive and less prosperous [and] we run the risk
of actually weakening our national security’ (National Research Council,
2009: 2). The United States intends to ensure the maintenance of its mili-
tary/technological preponderance by dismantling the so-called Fortress
America mentality and by erecting ‘higher walls around fewer items’,
namely on a narrowed down set of critical items that the United States can
still effectively control.23 In other words, Washington seeks to control less
in order to control better. Streamlining the export control bureaucratic
process allows to concentrate and focus the human and ﬁnancial resources
of the government on controlling the American ‘crown jewels’, namely
23 Interviews with ofﬁcials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, and with
lobbyists for the defense and high tech industry, March–December 2010, July 2011, and
November 2013, Washington, DC.
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those critical goods and technologies that are at the foundation of
American military primacy.
Since the dissolution of the USSR, the shifting dynamics at the multilat-
eral, technological, and bilateral levels examined in this paper have there-
fore coalesced in giving momentum to the Run Faster coalition in its
competition with the Control Hawks and led to its relative predominance
over the Control Hawks in the twenty-ﬁrst century.24 Speciﬁcally, these
trends include the weakening of the multilateral institution governing
export controls, the worldwide diffusion of technology, China’s expanding
indigenous capabilities, and the growing pressures of the US high-tech in-
dustry that ensued from rising US–China economic interdependence. As
forcefully emphasized by Stephen Bryen, former Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (1981–1988) and Commissioner on the US–China Economic
and Security Review Commission (2001–2005), who had been one of the
most vocal advocates of stringent export controls throughout the 1980s
and 1990s: ‘the kind of paradigm that we developed to deal with the Soviet
Union cannot be applied to China. Trying to do that is a lost cause. And the
potential today of using export control mechanisms to protect our interests
vis-à-vis China is minimal, if it exists at all. The US government no longer
has an ability to use export controls to control anything, or almost anything’
(interview, November 2010). The ﬁndings of this article have major conse-
quences for Sino–American relations and, potentially, for the prospects of
US military/technological dominance in the twenty-ﬁrst century. First, this
study demonstrates that the Cold War assumption that technology controls
were a conditio sine qua non for maintaining US military dominance
vis-à-vis its strategic competitors has collided with the geopolitical, econom-
ic, and technological realities of the post-Cold War era. The fact that poten-
tial competitors have access to commercially developed dual-use technology
on the global markets means that, in order to outcompete their adversaries,
the military and the defense contractors have to complement investments in
R&D and production activities in military-related technologies with excel-
ling at being the ﬁrst to integrate commercially available advanced technolo-
gies into military systems. The overlapping and intertwining of the logics of
military competition and economic interdependence at play in US–China
relations attest the growing complexity of interstate rivalry in a globalized
24 For a cross-sectoral comparison of the relative inﬂuence of the two coalitions in the areas of
satellites and information/communications technology export controls, see Meijer 2013a.
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economy. Second, in the longer term, a potential consequence of these
trends could be, as stressed by a report of the Pentagon’s Defense Science
Board, the leveling of the international military/technological playing ﬁeld
which would pose a ‘direct challenge to the fundamental assumption under-
lying the modern concept of US global military leadership: that the United
States enjoys disproportionately greater access to advanced technology than
its potential adversaries’ (DOD, 1999: 29). Nonetheless, the extent to which
the security, technological, and economic dynamics examined in this article
will erode American primacy in world politics and eventually lead to its
decline in the face of a rising China remains to be seen.
References
Baird, I. and Reinsch, W. (2002) ‘Does China matter to the health of the US
Economy?’, in K. Butts and E. Hughes (eds), Economics and National
Security: The Case of China. Carlisle, PA: US ArmyWar College.
Brzoska, M. (2006) ‘Trends in global military and civilian research and develop-
ment and their changing interface’, in Proceedings of the International Seminar
on Defence Finance and Economics. New Delhi, India.
Clarke, D. and Johnston, R. (1999) ‘US dual-use exports to China, Chinese behav-
ior, and the Israel factor: effective controls?’, Asian Survey, 39(2), 193–213.
Congressional Research Service. (2005) High performance computers and export
control policy: issues for congress.
Dahl, R. (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Fergusson, I. and McLoughlin, G. (2006) High Performance Computers and
Export Control Policy: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service.
Genieys, W. (2010) The New Custodians of the State: Programmatic Elites in
French Society. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Genieys, W. and Hassenteufel, P. (2012) ‘Qui gouverne les politiques publiques?
Par-delà la sociologie des élites’, Gouvernement et action publique, 2(2),
89–115.
Genieys, B. and Hassenteufel, P. (2015) ‘The Shaping of the New State Elites.
Healthcare Policymaking in France Since 1981’. Comparative Politics, 47(3),
forthcoming.
Gertz, B. (1999) Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American
Security. Washington, DC: Regnery.
Goodman, S., Wolcott, P. and Homer, P. (1998) High-Performance Computing,
National Security Applications, and Export Control Policy at the Close of the
20th Century. CISAC, Stanford: Stanford University.
Actors, coalitions, and the making of security policy 471
Guo, X. (2006) ‘Blockade on China or the United States? US regulatory policies
on space technology exports to China’, China Security, 2(1), 73–83.
Harding, H. (1992) A Fragile Relationship. The United States and China Since
1972. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.
Hoydysh, D. (2001) Statement in Establishing an Effective, Modern Framework for
Export Controls (Hearing).
Johnson-Freese, J. (2000) ‘Alice in Licenseland: US Satellite Export Controls since
1990’, Space Policy, 16(3), 195–204.
Kan, S. (1999) China’s Technology Acquisitions: Cox Committee’s Report –
Findings, Issues and Recommendations. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service.
Mann, J. (1999) About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship With
China from Nixon to Clinton. 1st edn. New York: Alfred Knopf.
Meijer, H. (2011) ‘Controlling the Uncontrollable? US Dual-Use Export Controls
in the Post-Cold War Era’, Fiche de l’IRSEM, Strategic Research Institute of
the French Military Academy. Available at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/
download/153100/1551427/ﬁle/Fiche_n10_Post_Cold_War_US_Export_Controls_
2.pdf.
Meijer, H. (2013a) ‘The Obama Administration’s Export Control Reform Effort’,
Lettre de l’IRSEM No. 5, Strategic Research Institute of the French Military.
Academy. Available at: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/irsem/publications/lettre-
de-l-irsem/les-lettres-de-l-irsem-2012-2013/2012-lettre-de-l-irsem/lettre-de-l-irsem-n-
5-2012/dossier-strategique-etat-des-lieux-du-marche-et-de-l-industrie-de-defense-
mondiale/the-obama-administration-s-export-control-reform.
Meijer, H. (2013b) Trading with the enemy: the making of U.S. export control
policy toward the People’s Republic of China. PhD dissertation, Paris, Institut
d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po).
Meijer, H. (2015) ‘Balancing conﬂicting security interests: US defense exports to
China in the last decade of the cold war’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 17(1),
(Winter).
Milhollin, G. (2000) ‘With looser computer controls we’re selling our safety short’,
Washington Post.
Milhollin, G. (2001) ‘Fast computers, deadly enemies’,New York Times.
Milhollin, G. (2002) Statement in Export Controls and China, Hearing before the
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 17.
Mills, C.W. (1956) The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morrison, W. (2013) US-China Trade Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service.
National Research Council. (2009) Beyond Fortress America: National Security
Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World. Washington, DC:
The National Academy Press.
472 HugoMeijer
Reinsch, W. (1999) ‘Export Controls in the Age of Globalization’, The Monitor:
Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control, 5(3), 3–6.
Rosecrance, R. (1997) ‘Economics and national security: the evolutionary
process’, in R. Shultz, G.H. Quester and R. Godson (eds), Security Studies for
the 21st Century. London: Brassey’s Publishers.
Ross, R. (1995) Negotiating Cooperation. The United States and China. 1969–
1989. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Segal, A. (2004) ‘Practical engagement: drawing a ﬁne line for US-China trade’,
The Washington Quarterly, 27(3), 157–173.
Suettinger, R. (2003) Beyond Tiananmen. The Politics of US-China Relations,
1989–2000. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.
Thompson, F. (2001) Statement in High Performance Computer Export Controls
(Hearing).
Triplett, W. and Timperlake, E. (1999) Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s
Military Threat to America. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). (2002) Annual
Report to Congress.
US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). (2004) China as
an Emerging Regional and Technological Power: Implications for the US
(Hearing).
US Commission on National Security/21st Century. (1999) New world coming:
American security in the 21st century. Available at: govinfo.library.unt.edu/
nssg/NWR_A.pdf.
US Congress. (1997) National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
PL 105–85.
US Congress. (1998) Chinese Access to Dual-Use and Military Technology
(Hearing).
US Congress. (2000) National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, PL
106–398.
US Department of Commerce. (1994a) ‘Background Paper for Assistant Secretary
Sue Eckert Meeting’, Conﬁdential, National Security Archive. Collection:
China and the US.
US Department of Commerce. (1994b) ‘US-China Export Control Issues’,
Classiﬁcation Unknown, Brieﬁng Paper, National Security Archive. Collection:
China and the US.
US Department of Commerce. (1996) Annual report to congress, bureau of export
administration. Available at: https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/
doc_details/930-bis-annual-report-fy-1996?tmpl=component.
US Department of Commerce. (1999) Untitled Report on US Export Control
Policy toward China. www.clintonlibrary.gov.
Actors, coalitions, and the making of security policy 473
US Department of Commerce. (2002) Bureau of Industry and Security Annual
Report for Fiscal Year 2002.
US Department of Commerce. (2011) Annual Report of the Bureau of Industry and
Security.
US Department of Defense. (1999) Final Report of the Defense Science Board –
Task Force on Globalization and Security. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/
ADA371887.htm.
US Department of Defense. (2007) The Military Power of the People’s Republic of
China. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-ﬁnal.
pdf.
US General Accounting Ofﬁce. (1998a) Export Controls: Changes in Controls
Applies to the Export of High Performance Computers.
US General Accounting Ofﬁce. (1998b) Export Controls: National Security Issues
and Foreign Availability for High Performance Computer Exports.
US General Accounting Ofﬁce. (1999) Export Controls: Statutory Reporting
Requirements for Computers Not Fully Addressed.
US General Accounting Ofﬁce. (2000) System for Controlling Exports of High
Performance Computing is Ineffective. December.
US General Accounting Ofﬁce. (2002) Export Controls: More Thorough Analysis
Needed to Justify Changes in High Performance Computer Controls, August,
GAO-02-892.
US General Accounting Ofﬁce. (2006a) Offshoring: US Semiconductor and
Software Industries Increasingly Produce in China and India. www.gao.gov/new.
items/d06423.pdf.
US General Accounting Ofﬁce. (2006b) President’s Justiﬁcation of the High
Performance Computer Control Threshold Does Not Fully Address National
Defense Authorization Act of 1998 Requirements, June 30. www.gao.gov/new.
items/d06754r.pdf.
US House of Representatives. (1996) Administration China Export Policy
Jeopardizes US National Security. Washington, DC: House National Security
Committee, Press Release. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt884/
html/CRPT-104hrpt884.htm.
US House of Representatives. (1997) Supercomputer Export Control Policy
(Hearing).
US Senate. (1995) National Security Implications of Lowered Export Controls on
Dual-Use Technologies and Defense Capabilities (Hearing).
US Senate. (1997) Proliferation and US Export Controls, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on International Security (Hearing).
US Senate. (1998) GAO Report on High Performance Computers (Hearing).
US Senate. (1998a) US Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy and the Role
and Responsibility of the Department of Defense (Hearing).
474 HugoMeijer
US Senate. (1998b) Transfer of Satellite Technology to China (Hearing).
Walsh, K. (2009) ‘The role, promise and challenges of dual-use technologies in
national defense’, in B. Richard (ed). The Modern Defense Industry: Political,
Economic, and Technological Issues. Oxford: Praeger.
Yuan, J.-D. (1996) ‘United States technology transfer policy toward China: post-
cold war objectives and strategies’, International Journal, 51(2), 47–79.
Zhang, S.G. (2001) Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and
the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Actors, coalitions, and the making of security policy 475
